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ABSTRACT 
This article mainly gives an overview of the policy developments in the Dutch 
railway sector over the past decade. The sector has come a long way and the 
outlook now looks positive. Customer satisfaction and performance have 
improved and the number of people that travel by train is rising. The development 
of a more long-term policy window for the sector seems to have brought rest and 
stability and room for continuous growth of passenger numbers. The combination 
of a policy making and negotiation regulatory style seems to have worked out very 
well on the performance of the sector. In a second section the paper also 
considers a theoretical framework on regulation schemes and develops a first 
tentative attempt to apply these schemes on an analysis of the Dutch railway 
sector by giving some statements for discussion. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article we describe the development and the use of regulatory styles in the 
railway market in the Netherlands over the past decade. A document containing the 
government position on the railway legislation evaluation report, including the 
evaluation of the current regulation model, has been sent to the Dutch parliament in 
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June 2009 (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2009). This document and its 
underlying reports are, amongst other documents, used in this article.  
The article is organized as follows. The first section provides an overview of railway 
policy development in the Netherlands from 1995 until 2008. Section two considers a 
theoretical framework on regulation schemes. The third section applies these schemes 
on the Dutch railway sector and gives some statements for discussion. 
OVERVIEW OF RAILWAY POLICY DEVELOPMENT 1995-2008 
The rail sector has been in continual flux ever since the 1990s. Over the years, views on 
the ultimate objectives for its organisation have changed. European legislation on 
market opening for rail freight was one of the drivers that started the restructuring 
process of the Dutch railway sector. Directive 91/440 asks for an administrative 
separation between infrastructure management and transport of passengers and freight. 
This separation is meant to encourage competition on the tracks for freight.  
In 1992 the Wijffels Committee, appointed by the Minister of Transport, worked out the 
new European rules and designed a new relation between the railway company and the 
state (Commissie Wijffels, 1992). The main idea of the reform was that passenger 
transport should become a non-subsidized commercial activity while building and 
maintaining the infrastructure remained a responsibility of the government. The Dutch 
railways (NS) was reorganized according to the recommendations of the Committee. 
Railway reform and transitional contract in the years 95-99 
The railway reform initiated in 1995 in the Netherlands aimed to increase the market 
share of railways in overall transportation and intended to lead to a lower burden on the 
public purse (van de Velde, 2005). NS undertakings were split up in 1995 (within the 
NS holding) into a number of separate companies each with its own account.  
The split up resulted in an organizational separation between the commercial activities – 
such as passenger transport, the exploitation of railway stations and development of real 
estate – and the infrastructure activities and infrastructure development and 
maintenance. The latter activities were placed in the so called ‘task organizations’. The 
three task organizations created in 1995 were: Railned, NS Traffic Control (NS 
Verkeersleiding) and NS Rail Infrastructure Management (NS Railinfrabeheer). Their 
costs were covered directly by the Ministry of Transport even though these 
organizations were still part of the NS concern. Passenger transport (NS Reizigers) and 
freight (NS Cargo) became separate organizations within the NS-holding. Later, the 
freight division was sold to the German Railion consortium, belonging to DB (Deutsche 
Bahn), being the state-owned rail operator of Germany.  
This new course resulted in a contract between the state and NS, which aimed at giving 
NS more freedom to make its own commercial decisions. It should be noted that this 
reform did not involve a privatization of NS, since NS has always been a joint-stock 
company (‘naamloze vennootschap’) with all shares held by the state. It refers more to 
the withdrawal of the subsidies. NS became an independent company free of the direct 
control by the Ministry of Transport even though the state remained as sole shareholder. 
The transitional contract between the state and NS for the period 1996-2000 was also 
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meant to allow the development of a new railway legislation to replace the Railway Act 
of 1875. For this period the transitional contract foresaw a gradual reduction of 
subsidies to NS and the possibility to stop operating non-profitable passenger services. 
This resulted in the separation of a number of non-profitable lines from the NS network. 
These were then, gradually, contracted out (based on government subsidies) to private 
parties1
Performance contracts in the years 99-2001 
. Also, in a first stage up to the year 2000, the government decided to set the 
charges for using the infrastructure at zero. 
In 1999 a policy document De Derde Eeuw Spoor (´The third Century of Rail´) 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1999) on competition and development of the 
railway sector was published by the Ministry of Transport. It chose for competition for 
the tracks for passenger transport. According to the policy document a 10-year 
concession contract was to be directly awarded to NS. This concession should include 
performance indicators with financial incentives on passenger growth and punctuality. It 
would contain conditions on minimum service levels, fare increases, integrated ticketing 
and access for people with reduced mobility. These proposals would be laid down in a 
new railway law and concession law. To bridge the gap until this law would be 
finalised, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was made up which set performance 
levels for punctuality and passenger growth in peak hours. The targets for these 
performance indicators were proposed by NS and agreed upon by the state. However, 
there were further delays in the legislation process. These delays made it necessary to 
make up a second transitional contract based on the MoU. This contract set performance 
levels for a period of 6 months and was extended twice for an additional period of 6 
months. 
In 1999 a report by the National Audit Office (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1999) concluded 
that the Ministry had failed in its supervisory and steering role of the task organizations, 
which were responsible for building and maintaining the infrastructure. The 
independence of the task organizations could not be guaranteed and adequate corrective 
action by the Ministry was overdue.  
In these years the level of train punctuality fell to a level that was not compliant with the 
second transitional contract (see Figure 1). The Ministry concluded that there was 
insufficient focus on integral quality by the management of various railway 
organizations within NS (task organizations and passenger transport). At that time, there 
were also internal changes and plans to create a different type of operational groups 
within the NS company. These plans however received massive opposition from the 
unions and left the company to decline rapidly as many strikes followed. The urgency of 
the situation led the Ministry to introduce a policy change, called “Herbezinning spoor” 
(Railway reconsideration) in September of 2001. The punctuality indicator was reduced 
from 88% to 80%. When NS towards the end of 2001 failed marginally to achieve the 
80% punctuality target, the full board of directors decided to resign. 
The railways’ poor performance in 2001 and the unrest this caused led to a reappraisal 
of the previous reorganisation plans. Parties in the rail sector and the government 
                                                 
1 Over the last years passenger growth and quality improvements on these lines have been realized 
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focused after this reappraisal on working more closely together and on remedying and 
improving the railways’ performance. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of customer satisfaction and punctuality 2000-2009 
Preparing for new legislation in the years 2001-2005 
Against this background, the second transitional contract was again extended for six 
months and subsequently for a period of one year until the starting day of the new 
Railway and Concession act. A full institutional separation between infrastructure 
management and train operations was implemented in 2002: all the infrastructure 
management tasks were separated from the other NS activities and these tasks merged 
into a new organisation called ProRail on 1 January 2003. This company is fully owned 
by the state, but entirely separate from NS. The minister of Transport acts as 
shareholder. It is responsible for rail capacity management, train path management, 
real-time passenger information, and management of the passenger transfer spaces at 
the stations, and infrastructure maintenance and development. ProRail operates within 
the framework set by the Ministry of Transport, concerning general policy on track 
usage and network development. 
In April 2003 the new Railway and Concession act were approved by the parliament. 
However, final parliamentary agreement on the concession texts could not be reached 
before December 2004, allowing the new regime to come into force in 2005, five years 
later than the original reform plan. As a result, the current organisation, with the 
relevant legislation, was only introduced in 2005 (see Figure 2).  
The organisation chosen in the Netherlands dovetails closely with European legislation 
and policy developments, which are aimed chiefly at opening up the market for freight 
transport and for international cross-border passenger transport. The Netherlands have 
always opposed opening up the national market because one railway undertaking with 
exclusive rights for the provision of passenger services in a region will be more able to 
optimise these services and secure reliability with both acceptable travel and transfer 
times especially in a densely used network such as in the Netherlands.  
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The Ministry of Transport has three distinct roles. Firstly it must oversee the public 
interest, secondly it awards the operating concession contracts and thirdly it is sole 
shareholder of ProRail. From 1 January 2005, the formal shareholdership of NS is 
transferred from the Ministry of Transport to the Ministry of Finance, such as to 
separate the role of regulator from that of owner. The government sets the rules and acts 
as a regulator according to the railway legislation. The mutual responsibilities of the 
infrastructure manager and train operating companies are stated in track access 
agreements.  
 
Figure 2: Current institutional configuration (van de Velde and Röntgen, 2009) 
The intensification of the cooperation between the infrastructure manager and the train 
operating companies is essential to the new regime. An example of forms of 
cooperation is the quarterly meetings under the name of Samensporen (´Tracking 
Together´) between the directors of ProRail, NS, Railion and a representative of the 
other freight operators. These meetings discuss interfaces between the three parties and 
monitor the progress of the better usage of capacity and the reliability of the entire 
railway system, to accommodate future growth.  
Building a new system: improving in the years 2005-2008 
Ten-year concession contracts for NS and ProRail were drawn up and enacted in 
January 2005. These concessions set performance indicators for NS and ProRail. NS 
and ProRail have to propose every year improved values for these indicators in so called 
transport and infrastucture plans. These values have to show continuous improvement 
or NS or ProRail have to explain why this is not possible in a certain year. Using yearly 
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plans makes the system flexible and makes adjustment to changing circumstances 
possible. The government analyses and then approves these proposals. In a transitional 
period up till 2007 both companies were allowed to learn to work with this indicator 
regime. The aim was to get ProRail and NS ready for output steering after a few years. 
This was to be reached in 2008 as from then on penalties are given if indicator levels are 
not met.  
Encouraging growth, better performance by NS and ProRail and development in 
the years 2008-2015 
The current railway legislation entered into force on 1 January 2005. The law required 
an evaluation of the regime in 2008. The four main conclusions of the final report of 
these evaluation were: 
● The rail sector now has a decent structure, but it needs to be put to better use. 
● Use of the railways by the public is improving. 
● The transport operators and the infrastructure manager are primarily responsible for 
day-to-day management. 
● The legal system could work better. 
The government concluded that a radical reorganisation is not required. However, the 
government has also come to the conclusion that the organisation needed some 
improvements which are laid down in a policy document.. The frameworks for user 
charges and allocation of capacity needs tightening up, needs to be improved and made 
more transparent, the position of regional authorities in the management of stations 
needs to be improved, and the position, role and management of the infrastructure 
manager ProRail, as well as NS need to be made more transparent. 
Not all improvements can be brought about through legislation. Equally important are 
the behaviour of the parties in the rail sector and cooperation between them, since they 
are the ones who have to deliver services. It is perceived that it is possible and indeed 
necessary to maintain and step up cooperation. Moreover, the points for improvement 
listed in the final report of the evaluation indicate that existing instruments are not fully 
utilised. 
The government has some ambitious aims for the rail sector in the Netherlands. It has 
identified four priorities for improving the quality and capacity of both passenger and 
freight transport. They are: 
● frequent services on the busiest lines in and around the Randstad in the west of the 
country; 
● cohesive regional public transport systems revolving around rail transport; 
● the quality of travel times to the various parts of the country; 
● a future-proof strategy for freight transport routes. 
In its 2007 coalition agreement, the government aimed for 5% annual growth in 
passenger transport during its term in office. In the medium term, €4.5 billion has been 
earmarked for investment in the rail sector, through the High Frequency Rail Transport 
Programme. The government plans to achieve these ambitious aims by expanding the 
capacity and quality of the railways and by making the organisation of the rail sector, 
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the rules and regulations applicable to it and the distribution of responsibilities between 
the various parties more transparent and more effective.  
Cooperation between the infrastructure manager and the transport operators has 
improved in recent years.  
The government is also planning to present a clear, uniform policy framework for user 
charges, which will lead to more clarity and certainty. The main concern is for tariffs 
and the principles on which they are based to be clear and the costs and the system used 
by ProRail for user charges to be transparent. Stability of the system, tariff development 
and better utilisation of the railways are also major considerations. 
NS and ProRail have improved their performance in the past few years. To keep them 
on track and stimulate growth, the government felt it is necessary to adapt its guidance 
of the two organizations in a number of areas. The government is planning to take a 
more hands-on approach to providing direction to the two parties. In 2010, the 
government will explore how the interface between the concession for the main rail 
network and existing regional concessions can best be designed in the new concession 
for the main rail network from 2015. It will do so in combination with its an exploration 
of the scope of the main rail network as opposed to regional networks. 
The government sees ProRail first and foremost as a provider of public services. As 
such, it should focus on implementing its statutory, public responsibilities. In order to 
ensure that ProRail fulfils this role, the government will bring more pressure to bear 
through its position as shareholder and awarder of concessions and grants. It will amend 
the company’s articles of association, give the State legal ownership of the main rail 
network infrastructure and expand its array of enforcement instruments. 
In view of the outcome of the evaluation and the government’s aims, NS’ concession 
for the main rail network will be modified. The government is planning to introduce a 
number of new performance indicators and expand its array of enforcement instruments. 
It has opted to press for more efficiency by charging NS for the concession from 2009, 
and requiring it to provide more detailed financial information. The Policy Document 
on State-Controlled Companies, will give the Minister of Finance, as NS shareholder, 
more forceful direction to secure the public interest (Tweede Kamer, 2007). 
On the basis of the evaluation, the government concludes that the position of provincial 
and regional authorities needs strengthening, and therefore plans to take statutory and 
organizational measures in a number of fields. Good regional transport networks are an 
essential and integral part of the transport chain that brings passengers from door to 
door. The government regards rail transport as the backbone of cohesive regional public 
transport systems, and is therefore in favour of more extensive cooperation with and 
between the authorities responsible for providing services. The provincial and regional 
authorities will be represented by their umbrella organisations in advisory groups, 
giving them the opportunity to provide input in assessing the management and transport 
plan. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON REGULATION SCHEMES 
This paper will now attempt to match the regulation methods used in the Dutch railway 
industry with the three regulatory styles based on the models of Wirick (1999). Kuit 
(2002) summarizes these styles in his dissertation on regulatory styles and strategic 
behavior as such: 
● Policy-making model: In this model the regulator is seen as a policy maker focusing 
on making effective objective decisions in the form of policy guidelines. 
Consultation of the involved parties takes place before setting these guidelines. The 
regulator uses a mechanistic-rational method to make decisions. 
● Regulation-by-negotiation model: This model is based on constant interaction 
between regulator and actors involved. The regulator enters into negotiations with 
them and tries to create win-win situations and consensus. The regulator uses process 
regulations and management tools. 
● Adhocratic-chaotic model: Regulators do not choose this model but end up using it 
when they have to deal with ambiguous issues. The outcome of this model is 
unpredictable. A conclusion can be reached using fixed procedures or negotiating 
with the involved parties. 
Table 1: properties of regulatory styles 
 
 Policy-making model Regulation-by-negotiation model Adhocratic-chaotic 
model 
Metaphor Regulator as policy-
maker 
Regulator as mediator Regulator as 
troubleshooter 
Focus Taking objective and 
effective decisions 
Creating win-win situations Not known in advance 
Instruments Information collection 
Decision-making 
methods 
Negotiating skills Dependent on the issue  
Outcomes Policy 
Guidelines 
Decisions 
Agreements 
Partnership agreements 
Dependent on the issue 
and process 
Regulation Substance based 
Active interference 
Mechanistic-rational 
Based on rules of the game 
Facilitated/conservative 
Consensus based 
Coincidence-based 
Active of facilitated 
Unpredictable 
 
DISCUSSION 
This section provides a few tentative statements for discussion. These are formulated on 
the basis of a first brief analysis of the developments of the railway policy in the 
Netherlands over the past 10 years as presented earlier in this paper. Note that further 
research and analysis is needed before being able to refine and validate these discussion 
statements. 
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Uncertainties on the final organisation of the sector have a negative effect on 
performance  
Looking into the past decade of railway policy, one can see that the views on the 
ultimate objectives for its organisation have changed. Competition on the track was for 
example foreseen combined with a possible privatisation of the state-owned company 
NS. Around the turn of the century, the policy was changed in competition for the track 
and privatisation was abolished. 
Uncertainties on the final organisation of the sector seem to have a negative effect on 
performance. NS refrained from investing in new trains because they were uncertain on 
their licence to operate in the forthcoming years, which made it unclear if they could 
make enough return on investments in the forthcoming years.  
After launching a more long-term policy window in 2001 and securing that NS would 
have a ten-year concession, one could observe that investments were made and that 
performance (like customer satisfaction and number of trains that run on time) 
improved (see Figure 1). 
Changing roles of players influence performance 
Over the past decade the three regulatory styles mentioned in the theoretical framework 
were all used by the government. In the first period form 1995 till 1999 NS had a great 
amount of autonomy. This lead to political pressures to make firmer arrangements to 
secure public values. These public values were secured in ad hoc contracts which were 
prolonged several times awaiting new legislation. These contracts can be characterised 
as instruments used in the policy making model. After consultation the government sets 
clear performance indicators and gives penalties for the event that these were not met by 
NS. The change in policy windows and prolongation of the contracts also fit the 
adhocratic chaotic model.  
The new legislation combines the policy making and negotiation model. The 
government sets performance indicators but the NS proposes the values. Before setting 
the final levels these are discussed between NS and the government. Once they levels 
are set the government will give penalties if performance indicators are not met which 
fits into the policy making model. The negotiations that take place between train 
operating companies and ProRail on track access and usage also fit into the negotiation 
model with the railway regulator as back up in case they do not come to an agreement. 
Hybrid position of railway companies complicates the system 
Railway companies have conflicting goals. On the one hand they want to secure public 
values like customer satisfaction and travel times. On the other hand, they want to 
improve efficiency and cut costs. The past period showed that these goals can be 
conflicting (for example NS proposed to shut down train stations in more rural areas 
with a low number of travellers or the closing down of toilets in some trains that run on 
short journeys). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This article has given an overview of the policy developments in the Dutch railway 
sector over the past decade. The sector has come a long way and the outlook now seems 
positive. Customer satisfaction and performance have improved and the number of 
people that travel by train is rising. The government has deemed that the policy that was 
set out in 2001 does not need big adjustments and it appears that the development of a 
more long-term policy window for the sector has brought rest and stability and room for 
continuous growth of passenger numbers. 
Further research and analysis is needed to refine and validate the statements on 
regulatory styles formulated above, but it seems that the combination of a policy 
making and negotiation regulatory style have worked out very well on the performance 
of the sector. 
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